The end of the cold war does not necessarily mean the end of the social and political instability that can lead to low-intensity conflicts. This book provides fresh insights into a difficult subject by bringing together knowledgeable contributors who have the academic expertise, operational experience, and strategic perspective essential to underst

The end of the cold war does not necessarily mean the end of the social and political instability that can lead to low-intensity conflicts. This book provides fresh insights into a difficult subject by bringing together knowledgeable contributors who have the academic expertise, operational experience, and strategic perspective essential to underst

Distinguished academic and practitioner contributors from the Middle East, Europe and the US present a range of social science oriented options to get the peace process back on track. Using the history of the last half century of talks and negotiations, and contributor experience in negotiations, suggestions, proposals and formulas are presented to the contending parties that would develop a greater level of mutual empathy, understanding and trust that is required to jump-start the stalled peace talks into sincere and serious negotiations needed to achieve a comprehensive, lasting Middle East peace accord. The focus of this volume is on how to achieve an agreement, not on the components of viable peace agreements, which the editors believe largely exist and are the subject of a number of earlier studies, books and the texts of draft accords reached previously in government-to-government and in private-parties negotiations. The editors and contributors assume a two-state solution based on "land for peace" and emphasise the importance of the role of outside mediators, especially the United States. Throughout the arguments presented, potential dialogue and agreement is overshadowed by the increasingly violent and chaotic environment of the Middle East that began worsening in 2001 with the second intifada and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Peace and a final agreement can only be reached through Arabs and Israelis making tough decisions and compromises. Readers will be intrigued, amused, encouraged and disappointed by accounts of incidents that de-railed past talks, the innovative analyses concerning past negotiations, and the potential for application of social science knowledge to the building of trust needed for attaining agreement.

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare--the gang.

Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void.

Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe.

As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and "uncomfortable" wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, 2001, the United States has faced daunting challenges in the areas of foreign policy and national security. Threatened by failing states, insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism, the nation has been compelled to re-evaluate its traditional responses to global conflict. In this timely book, John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring present a much-needed strategy for conducting unconventional warfare in an increasingly violent world.

In the early 1990s, Manwaring introduced a new paradigm for addressing low-intensity conflicts, or conflicts other than major wars. Termed the Manwaring Paradigm or SWORD (Small Wars Operations Research Directorate) model, it has been tested successfully by scholars and practitioners and refined in the wake of new and significant "uncomfortable wars" around the world, most notably the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Uncomfortable Wars" Revisited broadens the definition of the original paradigm and applies it to specific confrontations

As the first decade of the twenty-first century has made brutally clear, the very definitions of war and the enemy have changed almost beyond recognition. Threats to security are now as likely to come from armed propagandists, popular militias, or mercenary organizations as they are from conventional armies backed by nation-states. In this timely book, national security expert Max G. Manwaring explores a little-understood actor on the stage of irregular warfare - the gang.Since the end of the Cold War, some one hundred insurgencies or irregular wars have erupted throughout the world. Gangs have figured prominently in more than half of those conflicts, yet these and other nonstate actors have received little focused attention from scholars or analysts. This book fills that void. Employing a case study approach, and believing that shadows from the past often portend the future, Manwaring begins with a careful consideration of the writings of V. I. Lenin. He then scrutinizes the Piqueteros in Argentina, gangs in Colombia, private armies in Mexico, Hugo Chavez's use of popular militias in Venezuela, and the looming threat of Al Qaeda in Western Europe. As conventional warfare is increasingly eclipsed by these irregular and ""uncomfortable"" wars, Manwaring boldly diagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that policymakers should heed.

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime and Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries. Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world. The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare. Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare. Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

Today more than one hundred small, asymmetric, and revolutionary wars are being waged around the world. This book provides invaluable tools for fighting such wars by taking enemy perspectives into consideration. The third volume of a trilogy by Max G. Manwaring, it continues the arguments the author presented in "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime" and "Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries." Using case studies, Manwaring outlines vital survival lessons for leaders and organizations concerned with national security in our contemporary world.
The insurgencies Manwaring describes span the globe. Beginning with conflicts in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and El Salvador in the 1980s, he goes on to cover the Shining Path and its resurgence in Peru, Al Qaeda in Spain, popular militias in Cuba, Haiti, and Brazil, the Russian youth group Nashi, and drugs and politics in Guatemala, as well as cyber warfare.
Large, wealthy, well-armed nations such as the United States have learned from experience that these small wars and insurgencies do not resemble traditional wars fought between geographically distinct nation-state adversaries by easily identified military forces. Twenty-first-century irregular conflicts blur traditional distinctions among crime, terrorism, subversion, insurgency, militia, mercenary and gang activity, and warfare.
Manwaring's multidimensional paradigm offers military and civilian leaders a much needed blueprint for achieving strategic victories and ensuring global security now and in the future. It combines military and police efforts with politics, diplomacy, economics, psychology, and ethics. The challenge he presents to civilian and military leaders is to take probable enemy perspectives into consideration, and turn resultant conceptions into strategic victories.

One of the most common criticisms of current U.S. security policy is that it lacks an overarching strategy, leading to a tendency to address problems and crises individually and in isolation as they arise. This study provides a broad description of the contemporary global security environment and an examination of U.S. security policy since the end of the Cold War. Traditional threats, such as those associated with major theater war, now coexist with newer nontraditional threats. The authors maintain that a sound strategy must support the ability of a country to hedge and adapt to a highly volatile security landscape. That, in turn, is accomplished through an executive level organizational mechanism to authoritatively integrate and execute a cogent national policy.

Understanding the key concepts of strategy and strategy formation is essential in order to place specific challenges--such as global instability and state failure--in an appropriate strategic context. The contributors outline the conceptual guidance for a relevant strategy to deal with the myriad political, economic, informational, and deterrence threats and challenges generated in today's unstable, chaotic, violent, and ambiguous global security environment. Their conclusions are unequivocal. The United States must come to grips with the fundamentally transformed nature of security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. To do so requires a significant change in how the country develops its security strategy and how the country is organized to plan and implement that strategy.

"New insights for understanding and combating Al Qaeda and other contemporary security threats"

Wars were once fought mainly between nations--a presumption put to rest on September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda showed that nonstate actors could threaten a traditional nation-state and pursue strategic objectives without conventional weaponry, thereby altering the nature of war and often rendering military firepower meaningless.

National security expert Max G. Manwaring examines the emergence of nonstate actors in a geopolitical world. Manwaring invites policy makers to look past familiar insurgencies such as those in Vietnam and Iraq and consider global security problems from multiple perspectives. He concludes that the use of calculated political and psychological power may be the most effective response in many situations.

The power to make war no longer rests solely in the hands of traditional governments. Manwaring analyzes the context, conduct, and outcome of today's irregular wars and applies proven methods of effective response to seven case studies: Colombia, Al Qaeda, Portugal, Uruguay, Venezuela, Italy, and Central American gangs and criminal organizations.

"Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime" translates the cogent lessons of recent events into workable strategies for tomorrow's leaders. This book is required reading for students of national security policy and foreign-policy analysis.